Marshall on Custom and Competition by Schlicht, Ekkehart
Ekkehart Schlicht:
Marshall on Custom and Competition
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2004-12
Department of Economics
University of Munich
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Online at http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/369/
CUSTOM AND COMPETITION
EKKEHART SCHLICHT
Article for The Elgar Companion to AlfredMarshall, edited by Tiziano Raffaelli, Marco
Dardi, and Giacomo Becattini, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
INTRODUCTION
Marshall grounded his economics on Mill’s Principles (1848) and commented ex-
tensively on various aspects of the treatise. Hence the Millian juxtaposition of
the ’two conflicting principles’ of competition and custom must have provided
the background for many of Marshall’s observations on the topic. But Marshall
had a different vision: Rather than depicting custom and competition, like Mill,
as two conflicting albeit interacting forces, he conceived them as end-points of a
continuum, with custom as the passive and competition as the active pole, quite
in accordance with the motto of his Principles that there is continuity in nature -
natura non facit saltum.
In the following two sections I shall outline Marshall’s view of custom and compe-
tition. Although custom is of great importance, it is ’passive’: It tends to maintain
the current state of affairs. In contrast, competition or, as Marshall would prefer
to say, ’free enterprise’ and the ’the equilibration of measurable motives,’ is an
’active’ force that shapes custom in the long term. It turns out that the idea of pas-
sive custom clashes with the observation that modern markets have not eroded
the ’habits of trustfulness’ on which their functioning relies. In the concluding
section, I comment on this problem.
. PASSIVE CUSTOM
Marshall’s approach to issues of custom and competition may be conveniently
phrased in terms of his moving equilibrium method: At any given time there pre-
vails a set of customs and habits that guide human interaction. Many actions are
just customary or habitual, but others are the result of deliberate choice. Custom
acts as a constraint on free choice. (The mix between custom and deliberate choice
differs across societies. In traditional societies, custom preponderates, as it does
not leave much room for free choice, whereas modern societies tend to leave more
latitude for choice and give less weight to custom.)
The prevailing mix of custom and choice governs interaction and induces certain
outcomes as temporary equilibria. Because custom is never fully rigid and sharply
defined, such temporary equilibria may entail slight deviations from customary
Date: May 2004.

S C H L I C H T - M A R S H A L L O N C U S T O M A N D C O M P E T I T I O N
patterns. These deviations become customary after a while, therby shifting the
custom. In this way, custom will yield to outside forces. Marshall depicted this as
’friction’:
. . . there is a certain class of influences on human action which
do not tend to cause change: they play the same part in the moral
world that friction does in the mechanical. When several forces are
acting on a thing friction throws its strength with perfect impartial-
ity against whichever of them are tending to prevail over the others
and to cause movement. So whatever be the social forces that are
tending to prevail over others and to cause change, they are op-
posed by the forces of individual habit, of social custom, of apathy,
timidity and ignorance; or to sum up the whole in one word, by
the want of free enterprise. Their influence is none the less disturb-
ing because custom and habit have themselves in a great measure
been slowly fashioned in the course of long generations by the al-
most unconscious balancing against one another of the motives for
and against different courses of action. (Marshall, 1961, 140-1).
Marshall suggest that very traditional customs like those encountered ’in the East’
can be understood in this way as the outcome of competition, or, as he preferred
to say, ’the equilibration of measurable motives’. Economic arguments will break
up many costums like a telescope breaks up a nebula:
But . . . economic science has done much and I believe will do a
great deal more in applying contemporary observations of the East
to explain the economic past. In particular I think it will break up
and explain what are called economic customs, very much as the
telescope breaks up a nebula. To say that any arrangement is due
to custom, is really little more than to say that we do not know
its cause. I believe that very many economic customs could be
traced, if we only had knowledge enough, to the slow equilibra-
tion of measurable motives: that even in such a country as India
no custom retains its hold long after the relative positions of the
motives of demand and supply have so changed that the values,
which would bring them into stable equilibrium, are far removed
from those which the custom sanctions. (Marshall, 1885, 169-70).
This does not imply, however, that the forces of custom are weak. They may be
quite strong, but they are passive and and will ultimately yield to the forces of
competition:
It has been urged that as custom is often more powerful than com-
petition, it ought not to be spoken of slightingly as a mere friction.
But this is entirely to misapprehend the meaning of the term fric-
tion. A friction is not necessarily a small thing, but it is a passive
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resistance; and an active force, however small it is, acting on a ma-
terial that is not perfectly rigid, will in the long run overcome any
amount of friction. Human nature is never absolutely rigid; and
custom never holds its own in opposition to a strong active eco-
nomic force working for many generations persistently in the same
direction. (Marshall and Paley-Marshall, 1881, vi-vii).
The customs we find to-day are always functional. Sometimes, however, they will
be maintained as mere atavisms:
It is true that when a habit or a custom, which has grown up un-
der one set of conditions, influences action under other conditions,
there is so far no exact relation between the effort and the end
which is attained by it. In backward countries there are still many
habits and customs similar to those that lead a beaver in confine-
ment to build himself a dam. (Marshall, 1890, 21).
Yet such atavisms will be eroded in the long term. In short, and using Eric Jones’
(1995) terminology, Marshall assumes ’cultural fixity’ in short run and ’cultural
nullity’ in the long run. This explains in part that Marshall places particular em-
phasis on the constraining character of custom - the ’yoke of custom’ that is ’hin-
dering the method of production and the character of producers from develop-
ing themselves freely’ and sees the positive aspect of custom predominantly in its
’protective force.’ (Marshall, 1890, 12, 560, 641).
. COMPETITION
As remarked already, Marshall expressed uneasiness with the term, as it comprises
two elements: The pursue of one’s own advantage and an attempt to harm com-
petitors. It is the first element that is emphasized by Marshall, while the second
element is discounted. He writes:
The strict meaning of competition seems to be the racing of one
person against another, with special reference to bidding for the
sale or purchase of anything. This kind of racing is no doubt both
more intense and more widely extended than it used to be: but it
is only a secondary, and one might almost say, an accidental conse-
quence from the fundamental characteristics of modern industrial
life (Marshall, 1890, 5),
and he notes that there is no term that expresses the characteristics of what is
inappropriately referred to as ’competition’ adequately and goes on to characterize
’free competiton’ as follows:
A man competes freely when he is pursuing a course, which with-
out entering into any combination with others, he has deliberately
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selected as that which is likely to be of the greatest material advan-
tage to himself and his family. He is not supposed to be selfish:
in fact the normal supply of all grades of industry, except perhaps
the lowest, depends on the unselfish sacrifice by parents of their
own pleasures for the benefit of their children. But he is supposed
to be consulting his own material advantage and that of his family
to the comparative neglect of the welfare of others. (Marshall and
Paley-Marshall, 1881, vi-vii).
But spiteful behavior - in the sense of harming competitors rather than improving
one’s own performance in order to win the contest - is certainly encouraged by the
rise of free competition and the weakening of customary constraints:
Again, the modern era has undoubtedly given new openings for
dishonesty in trade. The advance of knowledge has discovered
new ways of making things appear other than they are, and has
rendered possible many new forms of adulteration. The producer
is now far removed from the ultimate consumer; and his wrong-
doings are not visitedwith the prompt and sharp punishmentwhich
falls on the head of a person who, being bound to live and die in
his native village, plays a dishonest trick on one of his neighbours.
(Marshall, 1890, 7).
Yet the rise of competition has not caused an overall moral decline; rather the
modern forms of free competition depend on habits of trustfulness that have not
emerged in more customary societies:
The opportunities for knavery are certainly more numerous than
they were; but there is no reason for thinking that people avail
themselves of a larger proportion of such opportunities than they
used to do. On the contrary, modernmethods of trade imply habits
of trustfulness on the one side and a power of resisting temptation
to dishonesty on the other, which do not exist among a backward
people. Instances of simple truth and personal fidelity are met with
under all social conditions: but those who have tried to establish
a business of modern type in a backward country find that they
can scarcely ever depend on the native population for filling posts
of trust. It is even more difficult to dispense with imported assis-
tance for work, which calls for a strong moral character, than for
that which requires great skill and mental ability. (Marshall, 1890,
7).
Growth of competition has, thus, not eroded the moral basis of society. This ob-
servation is presented as a fact, but such an observation poses a problem for Mar-
shall’s theory of custom.
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. CUSTOM AND GENERALIZATION
That competition has produced “habits of trustfulness” in spite of an increase in
opportunities for fraud runs against the grain of Marshall’s thesis on the passivity
of custom, and he notes this himself:
Adulteration and fraud in trade were rampant in the middle ages
to an extent that is very astonishing, when we consider the diffi-
culties of wrong-doing without detection at that time. (Marshall,
1890, 7).
Whether wrongdoing was harder to get away with in the Middle Ages may be
doubted. Yet the problem of how trust emerges in anonymous settings is central
for any proper understanding of the functioning of modern anonymous markets.
It requires, it seems to me, a modification of the idea of passive custom, yet cul-
tural fixity cannot be the answer: It is all too obvious that cultures are malleable
in many ways (Jones, 1995). One possibility is to look at the psychological forces
that shape custom (Schlicht, 1998). As customs must be learned and transmitted,
they must rely on features of simplicity and clarity and imply a tendency for gen-
eralization: The custom of walking on the left hand side of the sidewalk induces
a tendency to stick to the left on staircases and in supermarkets. This idea implies
an internal structure of any system of custom, brought about by a tendency to gen-
eralization. The active force of custom would then arise from such generalization.
This is an "internal" force of custom that enforces an overall interdependence of
all kinds of customary and market phenomena. I have argued that firms - as crea-
tures of the market - will devise internal mechanisms for fostering co-operation as
long as the production process benefits from those traits of "customary honesty.”
These behaviors will generalize to all kinds of social interaction, including mar-
ket interaction, and will provide the moral underpinnings for the functioning of
anonymous markets (Schlicht, 2004).
The thought is quite close to Marshall’s way of thinking. He notes:
For the business by which a person earns his livelihood generally
fills his thoughts during by far the greater part of those hours in
which his mind is at its best; during them his character is being
formed by theway inwhich he uses his faculties in his work, by the
thoughts and the feelings which it suggests, and by his relations to
his associates in work, his employers or his employees. (Marshall,
1890, 1).
This statement obviously rests on a generalization thesis - that attitudes shaped at
the workplace form "character" in general.
Combining Marshall’s view of custom with a generalization thesis may help to
overcome another weakness of Marshall’s theory of custom: Its inadequacy re-
garding discontinuity and tension. As Marshall (1890, 559) noted, customs may
break down, yet passive custommust be expected to adapt sluggishly but smoothly
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to changing circumstances, and it seems difficult to understand episodes of sud-
den growth or decay from Marshall’s theoretical perspective. Such “punctuation”
may occur not only with respect to technology, as Mokyr (1990) has maintained,
but also with respect to systems of customary arrangements. With generalization
as an active force, custom A is stabilized both by its instrumental usefulness and
because it is a generalization of custom B. Likewise, custom B is stabilized both
by its usefulness and by virtugeneralization from custom A. As a consequence, a
weakening of the instrumental reasons for A will weaken A and B, and this will
weaken A still further: Generalization will induce “cumulative causation” in the
sense of Myrdal (1944), and this may entail punctuation.
It remains a somewhat open question, however, whether a replacement of “pas-
sive custom” by “custom, passive but structured by generalization” provides a
satisfactory improvement over Marshall’s treatment with respect to long-term is-
sues.
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